Prof. Herman C. Hanko
In
earlier articles in the Journal we
described the problem which this series addresses: Were Calvin’s views of
predestination significantly altered by Beza and subsequent Reformed and
Presbyterian theologians? This point is often argued by students of Calvin. We
examined first of all the question from the point of view of some who argue
that not Beza, but Calvin himself altered his views on predestination in the
course of his life. Some argue this from an analysis of the different places
Calvin treats the doctrine of predestination in various editions of his Institutes. Others argue this position
from a comparison of Calvin’s Institutes
and his polemical writings, particularly the writings which emerged from his
controversy with Bolsec, a bitter opponent of predestination. We showed that these
arguments are without foundation. In a later article we began a discussion of
the question: Did Theodore Beza modify or change Calvin’s views on
predestination? We described the arguments which are raised in support of this
position and we offered an analysis of the issues. In this article we compare
the views of Calvin and Beza on the question of predestination and related
matters. A conclusion brings this series to a close. We are persuaded that
neither has Calvin himself altered his views on this subject, nor has Beza made
subsequent and substantive changes. It is clear from the evidence that those
who argue for such changes are really enemies of predestination and are
attempting to bolster their attack against this doctrine by appealing (though
without foundation) to important differences between Calvin and his successor.
Those who today hold to the truth of sovereign predestination, election and
reprobation, are those who are faithful to the heritage of the Reformation.
*
* * * * * *
* * *
*
After having examined in some detail
various questions that arise in connection with our comparison of Calvin and
Beza on the subject of predestination, we are now ready to compare their
writings on this question and see whether a comparison of these writings
actually shows that the two diverged significantly from each other.
A couple of preliminary remarks must be
made before we enter into the details of this question.
In the first place, our examination will,
in the nature of the case, concentrate on what Calvin wrote. Almost no
disagreement arises concerning the teachings of Beza. He admittedly taught a
view of predestination which includes: 1) both election and reprobation; 2) a
supralapsarian view of both; 3) a view of both election and reprobation which
makes God’s eternal and sovereign decree the ultimate explanation for the faith
of the elect and the unbelief of the reprobate; 4) an explanation of God’s
relation to sin in terms of cause. The question is whether Calvin also taught
these doctrines or whether Beza’s view was a distortion of Calvin’s teachings.
It is to Calvin’s writings that we must turn primarily.
In the second place, various related
doctrines are involved in this question. We have had occasion to call attention
to the fact that this question cannot be wholly answered unless one also
considers what Calvin taught concerning justification, the extent of the
atonement of Christ, the nature of the preaching of the gospel (i.e., whether
it is an offer which expresses God’s intent and desire to save all), and
Christ’s mediatorial work in heaven. But, although these questions are related
to our general subject, we cannot enter into all these questions, as important
as they are.
But some additional questions remain which
are so intimately related to the question of predestination that they must be
considered. We refer to such questions as: 1) the relation between God’s decree
and sin; 2) the relation between God’s decree and the first sin of Adam and Eve
in Paradise; 3) the relation between this first sin and subsequent sin which is
everywhere present in the human race; 4) the relation between election and
faith on the one hand, and the relation between reprobation and unbelief on the
other hand; 5) the relation between election and reprobation as decrees in the
counsel of God.
All the Reformers were agreed that the
sin which is present in the human race was the result of the first
transgression of Adam and Eve in Paradise. Their disobedience had consequences,
not only for themselves, but also for all their descendants. The sin which
merits the just wrath and punishment of God must be traced to its source: the
first act of sin by the parents of the human race.
What is not always clear from the
Reformers is the question of whether this original sin can be distinguished
into original guilt and original pollution. That is, there was no doubt in the
minds of the theologians of the sixteenth century that the pollution and
corruption of Adam’s sin was transmitted to all his descendants; but did these
same men also speak of a guilt of
Adam’s sin which was imputed to all so that all his descendants also stand
guilty for the sin which Adam committed. It seems that, while some references
in the Reformers, and also in Calvin, can be construed as teaching such an
original guilt, they never clearly set forth this aspect of the question and
concentrated mostly on original pollution.111
Of greater importance to our subject
is the question of God’s relation to sin, also the sin of our first parents.
This stands directly connected to our subject because it is involved in the
question of the nature and character of reprobation. The sovereignty of God in
the decree of reprobation involves the question of the sovereignty of God in
connection with the sin of the reprobate. Or, to put the question as succinctly
as possible: Is God the cause of the
sin of the reprobate?
The best way to get at these questions
is to discuss them together. And so we turn first of all to the views which
Beza held; and then turn to Calvin and discuss what he has to say on these
matters to ascertain whether any significant difference appears in the writings
of these two men.
That Beza was very strong on this
question cannot be doubted; and in fact, just because he was so strong, the
charge has been laid at his feet that he taught something different from
Calvin. We need not be extensive in our treatment of Beza, therefore.112
Although Beza offers a definition of
predestination in various places, they are all in agreement. We use the one
found in his Theological Theses, set
forth in the Genevan Academy by some students of sacred theology, under the
professors of sacred theology, doctors Theodore Beza and Anton Faye.113
In the first
place, we call predestination in general that eternal and unmoved decree of God
by which, as it pleased the highest and the greatest One himself, he has
decreed all things both universally and particularly, and executes them by
causes created and directed by him, as it likewise has pleased him for
revealing his own glory.
Secondly, when
we apply this doctrine especially to mankind, we call predestination that
eternal decree (of the sort we have already discussed) by which he decided
immutably and from eternity to save some by his highest mercy and to damn
others by his most just severity. Thus, from the effects, he demonstrated
himself to be as he in fact is: the Supremely Merciful and the Supremely Just.
Because God is sovereign also in
reprobation, God can be said to be the cause of sin and unbelief in the wicked
and impenitent.114 Yet Beza is careful here to distinguish in his
idea of causes. Although he uses different terminology, generally speaking he
makes use of primary and secondary causes. While God is the primary cause of
sin and unbelief, God executes His divine decree through secondary causes, the
chief of which is sin, and more particularly, the fall of Adam.115
However, these secondary causes are not compelled
by God’s decree.116 They are not compelled by God’s decree because
man acts in them as a morally accountable and willing creature.117
Because God works through these secondary causes, God is not the Author of sin,
nor can He be charged with unrighteousness.118 Man remains
accountable for his own sin and is morally culpable.
Moreover, the
condemnation of the reprobate is just because their perdition depends on God’s
predestination in such a way that the cause of their destruction and its whole
substance is nonetheless found in themselves.119
In connection with the will of God,
Beza holds to the simplicity of God’s will120 to ward against the error
of setting the will of God’s decree over against the will of His command. Nor
is Beza satisfied with the idea of a permissive will of God to explain its
relation to sin. The idea, says Beza, must be repudiated if it omits an active
willing on God’s part.121
There are, Beza says in another place,122
only four views of predestination: 1) the Pelagian view which teaches that the
cause of predestination lies in man and that God offers salvation to all; 2)
sovereign election and conditional reprobation which teaches a reprobation on
the basis of God’s foreknowledge of unbelief; 3) the Semi-Pelagian view which
teaches that salvation is partly of mercy and partly of man’s will; 4) the
Biblical position which teaches that election is by way of mercy and
reprobation by way of man’s sin. The Biblical teaching is that God’s will lies
behind the fall, that God’s grace is not offered to all, that God’s will is
neither frustrated nor dependent upon man’s will.
Muller123 therefore
correctly states that Beza did not teach a coordinate double decree. He writes:
Nevertheless,
subsequent to such rigidly causal argumentation Beza can, much like Calvin,
argue that reprobation can never be completely coordinate with election. The
decree to save the elect and the decree to damn the reprobate are manifestly
distinct in their execution: the former rests upon the faithful apprehension of
Christ while the latter rests upon the sin of the reprobate and its fruits.
Thus, the one decree of God is known in the elect as most merciful and in the
reprobate as most just.
Muller even goes so far as to say that
while Beza is supralapsarian in his explanation of the massa of Romans 9:21:124
Beza’s
analysis of the problem of sin accords more with an infralapsarian than with a
supralapsarian conception of the decree.
While we cannot agree with all of
Muller’s conclusions, they do set the matter in its proper perspective when he
writes:125
In conclusion,
... fully developed Reformed orthodoxy does not appear in Beza’s theology nor
does a thoroughly rationalistic and necessitarian perspective on theology …
Beza was a transition figure. He moved beyond Calvin in his use of scholastic
terminology and in the precision of his doctrinal statements. But his
“scholasticism” was moderate even by sixteenth century standards as set by Vermigli,
Zanchi, Ursinus, and Polanus, to name only a few. The analytic Empirical method
adopted by Beza in his last discussions of predestination represents his most
serious departure from the spirit of early Reformed theology, but like the syllogismus practicus it produced, it
did not become normative for later Reformed statements of the doctrine of
predestination. This analytic-empirical tendency is, moreover, balanced out by
Beza’s christological emphasis, particularly the development of the concept of
Christ’s mediation, and by a consistent stress on the economy of salvation.
This stress upon temporal economy is manifest in the ever-present distinction
between the decree and its execution, in the strong covenant-motif of the Confessio, and in the use of the
doctrine of predestination primarily as a ground for the ordo salutis in his major systematic structures. It would be a
mistake to say that there were no deterministic tendencies in Beza’s thought,
but these tendencies existed in tension with a christocentric piety and a very
real sense of the danger of determinism. Beza did not produce a predestinarian or
necessitarian system nor did he ineluctably draw Reformed theology toward
formulation of a causal metaphysic. Nor did he develop one locus to the neglect, exclusion, or deemphasis of others. Beza’s
role in the development of a Reformed system may better be described as a
generally successful attempt to clarify and to render more precise the
doctrinal definitions he had inherited from Calvin and the other Reformers of
the first era of theological codification.
From this brief statement concerning
Beza’s views, we turn now to the views of Calvin.
Concerning the relation between Adam’s
sin and the sin which is present in all men, Calvin taught that Adam’s sin had
such consequences for the human race that all men are involved in a complete
corruption of their nature so that they cannot, apart from grace, do any good
in the sight of God nor contribute in any way to their salvation.126
This corruption of the nature is so complete that it involves the will in such
a way that no good can proceed from it; i.e., that the corrupt sinner cannot
even will to do the good. Every
inclination of the will is only towards evil.127
This corruption of the nature is
sometimes explained in terms which seem to suggest that Calvin spoke of
original guilt as well as original pollution. In the above references mention
is sometimes made to the fact that man’s nature is corrupted because of his
responsibility for Adam’s sin of disobedience. Yet the distinction which later
Reformed theologians have made is certainly not clear in the writings of either
Calvin or Beza.
Concerning the relation between God’s
sovereign activity and man’s sin, the Reformer of Geneva was also strong. He
discussed the question frequently and did not shrink from using language of the
strongest kind. The relation between God’s will and man’s will is the same
whether one is speaking of Adam’s original sin or of man’s actual sin,
although, of course, Calvin recognized the fact that man’s sin is rooted in his
own depraved nature. Nevertheless, he insisted that even after the fall, God’s
control of sin is a reality which Scripture emphatically teaches.
Several points must be mentioned in
this connection. 1) Calvin maintained that this truth was implied in God’s
sovereignty as that truth is set forth in Scripture; and it is an integral part
of the doctrines of providence and predestination.128 2) He did not
hesitate to use such words as “cause” to define this relationship, although his
use of this term was circumscribed.129 3) He firmly believed that
the word “permission” did not adequately express this rclationship.130
Atkinson can therefore write (though not in a totally correct way)131
Yet Calvin
sees Providence in operation not only within the activity of believers and of
the elect, but in the area of the reprobate. The devil and the wicked operate
only by divine permission: every creature is an instrument in the hands of God.
Their wickedness lies in their being turned away from the will of God: their
wickedness God uses for His providential purpose.
Bangs also emphatically states that
Calvin taught a view which rooted Adam’s fall in the divine decree.132
And the Roman Catholic, Philip Hughes,133 says that Calvin taught a
predestination to hell.
This truth was the undergirding of
Calvin’s doctrine of predestination.
Calvin’s view differs in no
particulars from that of Beza. We need not quote extensively from Calvin, for
this truth is writ large in many places. We consider only the following.
Now, with
respect to the reprobate, whom the apostle introduces in the same place; as
Jacob, without any merit yet acquired by good works, is made the object of
grace, so Esau, while yet unpolluted by any crime, is accounted an object of
hatred. If we turn our attention to works, we insult the apostle, as though he
saw not that which is clear to us. Now, that he saw none, is evident, because
he expressly asserts the one to have been elected and the other rejected while
they had not done any good or evil; in order to prove the foundation of Divine
predestination not to be in works. Secondly, when he raises the objection
whether God is unjust, he never urges, what would have been the most absolute
and obvious defence of his justice, that God rewarded Esau according to his
wickedness; but contents himself with a different solution, that the reprobate
are raised up for this purpose, that the glory of God may be displayed by their
means. Lastly, he subjoins a concluding observation, that “God hath mercy on
whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth.” You see how he attributes
both to the mere will of God. If, therefore, we can assign no reason why he
grants mercy to his people but because such is his pleasure, neither shall we
find any other cause but his will for the reprobation of others. For when God
is said to harden or show mercy to whom he pleases, men are taught by this declaration
to seek no cause beside his will.134
I confess,
indeed, that all the descendants of Adam fell by the Divine will into that
miserable condition in which they are now involved; and this is what I asserted
from the beginning, that we must always return at last to the sovereign
determination of God’s will, the cause of which is hidden in himself.135
Those,
therefore, whom he has created to a life of shame and a death of destruction,
that they might be instruments of his wrath, and examples of his severity, he
causes to reach their appointed end, sometimes depriving them of the opportunity
of hearing the word, sometimes, by the preaching of it, increasing their
blindness and stupidity.136
All these quotations are taken from
Calvin’s Institutes. In his A Treatise on the Eternal Predestination of
God he ascribes the difference between Esau and Jacob to the hidden counsel
of God.137 He emphatically repudiates the idea that reprobation is
caused by works of men in any sense.138 He writes: “God, leaving
Pharaoh to his own will and inclination, destined him to destruction.”139
He adds: “This fact, nevertheless, remains fixed and unaltered, that the
reprobate are set apart, in the purpose of God, for the very end, that in them
God might show forth his power.”140 God hardens whom He will
according to His own pleasure and purpose.141 Calvin even says that
to say “that they were ‘fitted to destruction’ by their own wickedness is an idea so silly that it needs no notice.”142
In his treatment of John 12:37-41 he writes:
Now most
certainly John does not here give us to understand that the Jews were prevented
from believing by their sinfulness. For though this be quite true in one sense,
yet the cause of their not believing
must be traced to a far higher source. The secret and eternal purpose and counsel
of God must be viewed as the original cause of their blindness and unbelief ...
He says, “Therefore, they could not believe.” Wherefore, let men
torture themselves as long as they will with reasoning, the cause of the
difference made—why God does not reveal His arm equally to all—lies hidden in
His own eternal decree.”143
These references are sufficient to
prove conclusively that 1) Calvin roots reprobation in the decree of God; 2)
that thus the decree of reprobation is, along with election, eternal and
immutable; 3) that Calvin does not shrink from speaking of God’s decree as the
cause of sin; 4) that therefore, emphatically, Calvin teaches reprobation in
the same way as Beza later did.
With this view, the question arises:
How did Calvin still maintain man’s accountability?144
Confusion on this issue seems to be
fairly general among those who take the time to evaluate Calvin and Beza’s
thought. Bangs,145 e.g., speaks of the fact that Calvin speaks with
two voices concerning the fall. He says that Calvin taught that Adam fell by
free will and divine decree, while Beza denies the former. This is, obviously,
false. He then proceeds to quote Beza as insisting that the fall came about by
the decree of God, while he fails to note that Beza also insisted on the
activity of Adam’s will in connection with the fall. Alfred Plummer146
suggests that Calvin denied the human activity of the will and writes in a
footnote (p. 150):
It is
remarkable that the denial of man’s freedom to will and to act should have been
held so firmly by leaders whose wills were so masterful, and whose actions were
so vigorous, as in the case of all three, and especially of Luther and Calvin.
These and others seem to take the
position that if God is the sovereign “cause” of sin, man cannot any longer
function as a willing and moral agent. If this were true, man’s accountability
would certainly be denied.
Cunningham147 points out that
from a certain point of view this is not a very important question. The fact of
the matter is that Scripture teaches throughout that man is accountable before
God (even while it teaches God’s sovereign control over sin), and that this is
the testimony of every man’s conscience. No one ever disputes his
accountability, except in philosophical discussions. Every man knows he must
give account before God of what he has done.
Nevertheless, several considerations
enter in. 1) One difference, though not decisive, exists between Adam’s first
sin and the actual sins of the descendants of Adam. Adam sinned with a free
will, able to choose between good and evil. His descendants sin because of a
corrupt nature which makes even the will totally in the control of sin. While,
therefore, Adam’s accountability rests in his ability to choose either the evil
or the good, our accountability rests in the fact that we are responsible in
Adam for the corrupt nature which we possess.148 Hence, out of our
accountability for our corrupt nature, arises our accountability for our actual
sins. 2) Calvin especially often called attention to the difference between primary
and secondary causes in his attempt to explain this; and he has been followed
by many. God is the primary cause, but He makes use of secondary causes.
Because these secondary causes are present, man remains accountable and God
cannot be charged with sin. 3) But the chief point which Calvin made was his
insistence that no man sins by compulsion.
Sometimes the point itself was
emphasized in such a way that man was shown to sin willingly; sometimes man was
said to have, even in a fallen state, a free will not in the sense of being
able to choose between the good and evil, but in the sense of always willing in
harmony with his nature and sinning always without any compulsion and coercion
of any kind.149 Nor did Calvin see conflict here of the nature of a
contradiction or even an apparent contradiction; although he would be the first
to admit that God’s ways are inscrutable. And here Calvin was content to rest.
Thus we may conclude that in the doctrine
itself, no discrepancy or alteration can be found in the teachings of Beza and
Calvin.
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FOOTNOTES:
111. Even our creeds do not speak clearly of
anything but original pollution, and it remains a question whether the Westminster Confession specifically
mentions original guilt.
112. All the references in what follows are to Holtrop’s
translation. We have made references here only to the pages, because the titles
of Beza’s works are very lengthy and are included in the Bibliography. The
precise work referred to can be discovered by consulting the translations.
113. Ibid.,
p. 413.
114. Ibid.,
p. 101.
115. Ibid.,
p. 101.
116. Ibid.,
p. 111.
117. Beza often discusses the relation between
God’s will and man’s will and gives clearly his ideas on this score. See, e.g.,
pp. 125, 130.
118. Ibid.,
pp. 101-108.
119. Ibid.,
p. 115.
120. Ibid.,
pp. 285-289.
121. Ibid.,
pp. 220, 221, 341.
122. Ibid.,
pp. 456, 457.
123. Richard A. Muller, Christ and the Decree (Durham: Labyrinth Press, 1986), p.88.
124. Ibid.,
p. 89.
125. Ibid.,
p. 96.
126. While the references are many, we can
specifically refer here to Institutes,
II, 1-5, particularly v, vi, ix; Calvin’s
Calvinism, pp. 90ff. Throughout we make use of John Allen’s translation of
the Institutes (Grand Rapids: Wm. B.
Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1949) and Calvin’s
Calvinism, tr. by Henry Cole (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.,
1956). This book contains both “A Treatise on the Eternal Predestination of
God,” the so-called Consensus Genevensis,
and “A Defense of the Secret Providence of God.”
127. Institutes,
II, 2, xii; II, 3, v, viii, ix.
128. See, e.g., Calvin’s Calvinism, pp. 240, 241.
129. Institutes,
I, 18, 11; II, 4, vi; Calvin’s Calvinism,
pp. 81, 83,
130. Institutes,
I, 18, ii; II, 4, iii. In this later reference Calvin refers to Augustine who also
believed that permission did not adequately express this important relation. It
is interesting to note, however, that Calvin did sometimes use the word in
describing God’s sovereign control of sin.
131. James Atkinson, The Green Light (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1968),
p. 176.
132. Carl Bangs, Arminius (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1971), p. 69.
133. Philip Hughes, A Popular History of the Reformation (New York: Image Books, 1960),
p. 229.
134. Institutes,
III, 22, xi.
135. Institutes,
III, 23, iv.
136. Institutes,
III, 24, xii. See also III, 21, v, vii; III, 22, vii; III, 23, ii, and many other
places.
137. John Calvin, A Treatise on the Eternal Predestination of God, p. 58.
138. Ibid.,
p. 63.
139. Ibid.,
p. 67.
140. Ibid.,
p. 67.
141. Ibid.,
p. 68.
142. Ibid.,
p. 76.
143. Ibid.,
p. 81. See also pp. 82, 83, 91-93 for similar ideas.
144. Although theologians usually speak of the
responsibility of man, we consider the term accountability
the preferable one. Responsibility means only that man is able to respond, a
patent fact which needs no argumentation. Accountability, on the other hand, means
that man is accountable before God for what he does.
145. Bangs, op.
cit., pp. 68, 69.
146. Alfred Plummer, The Continental Reformation (London: Robert Scott, Roxburghe House,
1912).
147. William Cunningham, Historical Theology, (Banner of Truth Trust, 1969), pp. 596ff.
148. Calvin’s
Calvinism, p. 90.
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